Organizing individual appropriators into output sharing groups has been found to effectively solve the tragedy of the commons problem. We experimentally investigate the robustness of this solution by introducing different channels of communication that naturally arise from group competitions. In the absence of communication, we confirm that output sharing can introduce sufficient free riding to offset over-harvesting and results in full efficiency. Allowing local communication within output-sharing groups substantially decreases this efficiency enhancement because it reduces free riding and boosts betweengroup competition. Yet the efficiency level is still significantly higher than that achieved when global communication is allowed among all appropriators in a conventional common pool resource without output sharing. The efficiency-reducing effect of local communication is mitigated when random partners instead of fixed partners are sharing output over time, and is nearly eliminated when random partners are formed with users who belong to different communication groups.
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1950s, economists have been searching for solutions to social dilemmas. One solution that has harnessed much support is allowing communication even when it is merely nonbinding "cheap talk" (Sally 1995; Bicchieri 2002; Balliet 2010) .
1 Experimental studies have shown that communication in common pool resources (CPRs) and voluntary contribution public good games improves cooperation and can overcome tragedy-of-the-commons and free-riding behavior (Isaac and Walker 1988; Hackett et al. 1994; Ostrom et al. 1994; Ledyard 1995; Chan et al. 1999; Kinukawa et al. 2000; Ahn et al. 2010 ). These studies suggest that the decentralized governance of CPRs and public goods is possible as long as agents are able to communicate with each other on a repeated basis. This conclusion on the positive effect of communication is drawn when considering only conflicts between individual and collective interest.
There is a lack of studies that systematically examine whether and to what extent we can generalize this result to situations where multi-level conflicts exist on the individual, group and collective levels.
Researchers have long recognized that many social dilemmas involve multi-level interactions because groups instead of individuals are competing in providing public goods, extracting from CPRs or competing for market shares. The interplay of within-group conflict and between-group competition may sometimes mitigate the efficiency loss caused by each. Investigation of these complicated multi-level collective action problems has led to the invention of some clever methods to combine these competing forces and achieve better outcomes. Prominent examples include using inter-group competition to reduce free riding in within-group conflicts (Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 2005) and creating within-group free riding through the use of output-sharing groups to reduce excessive exploitation from a common pool (Schott 2001 and Heintzelman et al. 2009 ). In the latter case, the presence of groups that must share output extracted from the CPR creates a situation in which over-appropriators will reduce their extraction effort because they will have an incentive to free-ride on the effort of their group members. But these studies do not consider the role of communication in these mechanisms.
There are also several field examples of output-sharing partnerships involving common pools.
Most traditional hunter-gatherer societies share their hunt with other households that do not necessarily participate in hunting or contribute to the financing of the harvest. These practices are still quite dominant over large areas of the Arctic (Collings et al. 1998) , in various Canadian provinces and in Australia whenever aboriginal groups are involved in the use and management of wildlife resources. In Japan a number of inshore and midshore fishing enterprises manage their resource by pooling their catch and distributing revenues equally among their group members (see Yamamoto 1995; Platteau and Seki 2001; Carpenter and Seki 2011) . Japanese fishermen who pool their catch consistently have a higher catch per unit of effort than those in the same fishery and fishing area who do not. The Japanese fishermen's output-sharing schemes are similar to a fixed-group sharing scheme practiced by 'Uihan fishermen in Tonga in the South Pacific (Bender et al. 2002) . This is in contrast with Lofangan fishermen, also from Tonga, who use a random-group informal sharing system (Chakraborty 2004 ) and have a significantly larger catch per unit of effort (Bender et al. 2002) . These empirical observations illustrate the importance of carefully examining the influence of the type of partnership organization on the effectiveness of common pool resource management.
In most field contexts communication amongst individuals and groups of individuals is likely to be both possible and popular. Group members could be discussing common strategies; members of different groups may speak with one another either to coordinate actions or to provide deceptive information in attempts to gain strategic advantages, and members of groups may speak with others in social contexts when group memberships may be unknown. New means of electronic communication are evolving to allow people to communicate with others whom they never see or meet but with whom they work or against whom they compete. In such naturally occurring environments, with multi-level interactions, many channels of communication may arise. Different channels of communication may have opposing effects on the offsetting externalities. A better understanding of the impact of communication is highly relevant to how mechanisms such as output-sharing groups in a CPR function and perform.
We aim to bridge the literature on communication in the commons and the literature on outputsharing and the partnership solution by carefully studying a strategic situation in the laboratory where communication can be a double-edged sword depending on the specific communication channels available on different levels of interactions. The partnership solution to the CPR problem proposed by Schott (2001) provides an ideal environment for our purpose. With this management instrument, agents exploiting a CPR are placed in a number of output-sharing groups or partnerships. Members of each group must combine their harvest and share it equally. Equal sharing introduces a positive externality and provides an incentive for agents to reduce their harvesting effort and free ride on their partners. This shirking can offset the over-harvesting incentive characteristic of multiple agents appropriating from a common pool. Schott et al. (2007) demonstrated this effect in laboratory experiments and showed that groups allocate effort efficiently when the socially optimal output-sharing group size is established. Cherry et al. (2015) extend the work of Schott et al. (2007) by investigating the endogenous choice of the number of output-sharing groups that will form in a CPR via a voting mechanism. Neither Schott et al. (2007) nor Cherry et al. (2015) address the efficacy of output sharing as a management mechanism in environments with communication among the appropriators from the CPR. (Rapoport and Bornstein 1989; Schram and Sonnemans 1996; Cason et al. 2012; Leibbrandt and Saaksvuori 2012 and Zhang 2012) . Sutter and Strassmair (2009) examine the impact of communication in a group tournament in which the prize is not fixed and is paid by the losing team and shared equally in the winning team. They find that free riding dominates when teams cannot communicate or can only communicate with members of other teams. Communication within teams, on the other hand, increases individual contributions and efficiency. Contrary to extraction activity that provides a return that depends upon the aggregate effort of all 12 participants. The form of the yield function, parameters for the yield function, the opportunity cost of allocating the effort endowment, the effort endowment of participants in the CPR and the number of participants are identical
to the values used in Schott et al. (2007) . In the interest of brevity the term effort will henceforth refer only to the effort devoted to resource extraction, unless another interpretation is clearly required by the context. The experiment itself is conducted with neutral framing where effort is referred to as Investment and the two activities are identified as Market One and Market Two.
The total output from resource extraction is = 32.5 − 0.09375
where is total output appropriated from the CPR and is the sum of the resource-extraction effort of all participants. In the conventional CPR environment without output sharing, which we shall refer to as the CPR treatment, each appropriator from the CPR receives a share of total output that is proportional to his effort. 3 Thus the individual profit function (in lab dollars) in the CPR treatment is
where is the harvesting effort of individual i.
theirs, in our experiment incentives are not monotonic as higher group contributions may lead to lower efficiency due to the congestion externality and the non-linear payoff of the CPR. 3 In this context a treatment is a combination of factors. Factors are variables that have two or more levels. For example, in this experiment output sharing is a factor that can take on a Boolean value of true or false. Similarly, local communication also is a factor that can take on a Boolean value of true or false. For the CPR treatment both output sharing and local communication factors are false. All of the factors used in this study along with their combinations (i.e. treatments) will be described below (see Treatment 2015) .
Y X
Output sharing is introduced by dividing the 12 participants into 3 groups of 4. The assignment of participants to groups may be fixed for the duration of the session or randomly remixed after each period. Output is distributed to each group in proportion to the group's effort, , and this output is distributed equally to all group members. The return to each unit of output is normalized to one lab dollar (L$). Given the group size of 4, the individual profit function (in lab dollars) under output sharing is 4 Janssen et al. (2010) introduce chat-room communication into a CPR setting in which it is possible to destroy the CPR by over appropriation. Chat-room communication is successful in forestalling destruction of the CPR and raising profit. This result is similar to the results reported by Muller and Vickers (1996) who use face-to-face communication. Bochet et al. (2006) compare different forms of communication in public goods laboratory experiments and find little difference between the effects of face-to-face communication and verbal communication through a chat room. 5 Prior to the first decision round, individuals are given four minutes to send messages. Prior to the second and third decision rounds, individuals are given three minutes to communicate. Prior to the fourth round this is set at two minutes and from the fifth through the fifteenth rounds, communication is limited to one minute. These time limits were based on debriefing subjects after several pilot sessions. Table 1 , and are organized by communication and output-sharing characteristics. Predictions for expected system effort for each of the twelve treatments are presented in subsections 2.1 through 2.5.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Equilibrium Predictions: No Communication with and without Output-Sharing Groups
The basic CPR environment has no output sharing and no communication and presents a standard CPR dilemma. In our environment, 12 subjects make independent appropriation-effort decisions in an attempt to maximize the profit function given by equation (2). The Nash equilibrium for this environment has each appropriator exerting 24 units of effort to extraction from the CPR (288 for aggregate system effort).
This is Prediction 1a.
In the Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners treatments with three four-person output-sharing groups each appropriator will maximize the profit function given by equation (3). Output sharing induces appropriators to free-ride on the members of their output-sharing groups and this will constrain the overextraction present in this environment. The unique group-Nash-equilibrium effort for each of the three four-person groups is 52, regardless of whether group membership is fixed over the session or randomly reassigned after each decision round. This also is the surplus-maximizing allocation of effort. There is no unique equilibrium allocation of group effort for individuals in the group but the equilibrium system effort of 156 is unique. 6 This is Prediction 1b.
Equilibrium Predictions: Global Communication with and without Output-Sharing Groups
6 See section 1 of Appendix III for a derivation of the equilibrium results. See Schott et al. (2007) for the derivation of the optimal effort to allocate to appropriation from the common pool.
Communication can inform players of the beliefs of other players. If actions reaffirm these beliefs, then cooperation may be sustainable in a repeated-game setting (see Hackett et al. 1994, pp. 107-108) . There are few behavioral models of decision-making in a CPR environment with communication from which we can derive a prediction about the role of communication. However, for environments such as ours, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that treatments that include global communication without output sharing would reduce system effort and increase efficiency significantly relative to the basic CPR environment without global communication (see Ostrom et al., 1994, Chapters 7, 8; Muller and Vickers, 1996) . Therefore, we expect that effort in the CPR with Global Communication will be less than 288
units. This is Prediction 2a. Because equilibrium output is predicted to be optimal in output-sharing environments without communication, the introduction of global communication is likely to have no effect and our expected system effort is 156 for the Fixed-Partners with Global Communication and Random-Partners with Global Communication treatments. This is Prediction 2b.
Equilibrium Predictions: Local Communication and Output Sharing with Linked Fixed and Random

Partners
When communication groups are linked with output-sharing groups it is possible for the participants within the output-sharing groups to discuss extraction strategies. Joint and individual payoffs within a group will be maximized if the linked communication and output-sharing group acts as a single economic agent in competition against other output-sharing groups. Thus, each group would maximize a profit function represented by equation (3) aggregated over its four group members.
If all groups behave this way there will be a system-wide group profit-maximizing equilibrium consistent with a three-agent Nash equilibrium. This will yield a unique group Nash equilibrium level of extraction effort of 78 units (234 units for the system). 7 In this context, local communication among output-sharing group members will lead to the reduction of shirking and a system-wide increase in effort relative to the no-communication equilibrium for the Fixed-Partners or Random-Partners treatments.
System effort for the Linked Fixed-Partners with Local Communication treatment will be 234 units. This is Prediction 3a.
However, the outcome will still be more efficient than that expected to be obtained in the basic CPR treatment. Because communication requires repeated interactions and reinforcement it is less likely that the group profit-maximizing equilibrium will be realized when linked output-sharing groups are randomly reassigned each decision round than when they are fixed for the session. Generally, for linked local-communication and output-sharing groups, effort is expected to rise from levels without local communication. This is Prediction 3c.
Equilibrium Predictions: Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Linked Fixed and Random Partners
For Because of the coordination and adjustment issues described earlier for the Random-Partners treatments, it is more likely that the impact of global communication on system effort will be greater for the Fixed-Partners treatments. This is Prediction 4c.
Equilibrium Predictions: Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Unlinked Random Partners
When local-communication groups are not linked with output-sharing groups it is not possible for the participants within the output-sharing groups to discuss extraction strategies among themselves. If the appropriators of the CPR are able to communicate in fixed groups that are different from their outputsharing groups, and if the output-sharing groups are randomly reassigned each period then we expect that system effort would be the same as for the Random-Partners treatment without communication.
Therefore system effort for treatment with unlinked random partners and local communication is expected to be 156 units.
Just as the introduction of local communication could lead to a reduction in shirking among members of an output-sharing group, the introduction of global communication could lead to a coordinated reduction of effort by all members of the CPR. The introduction of global communication is not likely to alter the outcomes of those treatments that are already expected to realize an efficient system effort of 156 units. Therefore the expected system effort for the Unlinked Random-Partners with Local
Communication treatment and the Unlinked Random-Partners with Global and Local Communication treatment is 156. These are Predictions 5a and 5b. Associated with these predictions is the prediction that system effort will be lower in Unlinked Random-Partners treatments than in Linked Random-Partners treatments. This is Prediction 5c.
All of the predicted system effort outcomes introduced above are presented in Table 2 along with the mean system effort resulting from the laboratory implementation of each of the twelve different treatments.
[Insert Table 2 about here] 3. RESULTS Figure 1 presents the mean system effort by treatment. The equilibrium predictions for each treatment and the realized mean system efforts for each treatment are provided in Table 2 . There are 48 independent session observations. We regress mean system effort, computed over the entire session, on the five factors and their interactions. We use robust (heteroscedasticity consistent) standard errors. The constant in the regression is the mean system effort associated with the CPR treatment. The regression results are presented in Table 3 . Statistical tests in the remainder of the paper use the robust standard errors from this regression unless otherwise noted. Results from appropriate non-parametric versions of these tests are also presented. We analyse the results under the five headings corresponding to the headings containing predictions in Section 2.
Experimental Procedures
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
No Communication with and without Output Sharing
In this sub-section we test hypotheses related to the basic CPR, the Fixed-Partners and the RandomPartners treatments. The hypotheses concern the performance of the participants in these treatments relative to the theoretical predictions for these treatments. The parametric tests are based on the results reported in Table 3 . For example, the system mean effort in the Fixed-Partners treatment is equal to the sum of the coefficients for the constant (284.22; this represents the absence of output sharing and any communication, which is the CPR treatment) and the fixed-partners factor (-133.82 ). This is equal to 150.40. Using the statistical software package STATA® we can test the difference between the sum of these two coefficients and 156, which is the predicted value for this treatment.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The mean system effort in the basic CPR treatment is 284.22. This is not significantly different effort and the realized system effort for these treatments are presented in Table 2 .
From Table 2 
Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Linked Fixed and Random Partners
The Although these differences are of the predicted magnitudes, they are not significantly different (F-test, p = 0.443). The data support Prediction 4a but not Predictions 4b and 4c. Result 6 follows.
Result 6.
Global communication mitigates the effect of local communication, reducing effort and increasing efficiency in the Linked Fixed-Partners but not in the Random-Partners with
Local Communication Treatment. 
Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Unlinked Random Partners
Result 7. Breaking the link between output-sharing and local communication groups nearly eliminates the effort-enhancing effect of local communication and leads to nearly optimal system effort that is much lower than in Linked Fixed-Partners and Linked Random-
Partners with Local Communication treatments (with or without Global Communication).
Unpredicted Results
There are several outcomes that were not predicted that are worth presenting at this time. 
Result 8. Output sharing in the absence of communication is more effective at managing overappropriation from the commons than global communication.
A second relationship about which we made no prediction was how the increases in system effort 
Result 9. The efficiency-diminishing effects of local communication in output-sharing treatments still results in the output-sharing treatments outperforming the CPR with Global
Communication treatment.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the absence of output sharing and communication we have a conventional CPR treatment with a larger number of participants than typically used in a laboratory experimental study. In this treatment participants jointly apply the amount of system effort predicted as the Nash equilibrium. It is significantly greater than the optimal system effort. Introducing global communication across all subjects reduces system effort and enhances efficiency, although to a significantly lesser degree than found in the literature (see, for example, the small endowment environment in Ostrom et al. 1994) . Introducing an externality to offset the one inherent to the CPR through the use of output sharing proved to be far more harvest caught by teams of hunters and fishers because extensive sharing reduces hunting effort sufficiently to protect common property from over-exploitation (Cherry et al. 2015; Kagi 2001; Sahlins 1972) . Examples can be found in virtually all traditional societies, e.g. in Canada's North for the harvest of fish, marine and land mammals (Collings et al. 1998; Harder and Wenzel 2012) , fisheries in the South Pacific (Bender et al. 2002) and inshore fisheries in Japan that pool catch among vessels and share it equally (Yamamoto 1995; Platteau and Saki 2000) . The impact of the change in communication groups
(through social media, web information and E-mail) and the change in sharing networks and type of partnerships on the use and conservation of common pool resources will need to be better understood and evaluated for more effective wildlife and fishery management solutions.
Our insights on communication channels and the partnership solution can also be applied to evaluate and improve other management tools that introduce counteracting externalities in environments involving social dilemmas and unobservable effort. For example, to avoid wasteful duplication in innovation tournaments, researchers often form joint ventures that compete to develop the best innovation and share the benefits within their own group (Baye and Hoppe 2003) . In professional sports leagues, revenue sharing is used to reduce overinvestment in attracting fans, talented players, coaches and to maintain the right competitive balance to maximize aggregate league revenue (Atkinson et al. 1988; Dietl et al. 2008) . Moreover, team regrouping is actually a common practice in the business world. Quite often teams are formed when a specific problem arises, and dissolved right after the problem is solved. Such short-lived problem-solving teams are not only popular among law firms, consulting firms and medical group partnerships, but also are increasingly popular among manufacturing or service firms (Boning et al. 2007 ). This suggests that our proposal of randomizing output-sharing groups or to separate communication groups from output-sharing groups to offset the negative effect of local communication is not only of a theoretical interest, but also has a basis in practice as well. Table 1 represent configurations of the communication and outputsharing conditions that cannot exist. The remaining twelve cells represent the twelve treatments studied in this experiment. We could have examined both output sharing groups with random partners and unlinked fixed communication groups and output sharing groups with fixed partners and unlinked random communication groups but chose to only examine the former because we believe the fixed communication groups are most common in the field (representative of costless communication within social or community groups). These are described in more detail in the subsections 2.1 through 2.5. Instructions for unlinked random partners with local communication treatment are included in Appendix I. Screen shots for the computer-mediated environment are included in Appendix II. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The upper case letters in parentheses are identifiers for the different factors. 
Introduction
You are about to participate in a project about economic decision-making. You will be asked to make decisions about the investment of resources between two activities, which will be referred to as Markets 1 and 2. The amount of money you will earn in today's session will depend on your investment in Market 1 and the sum of your and others' investments in Market 2. Your earnings will be paid to you privately, in cash, at the end of the session. The money for this project is provided by several funding agencies.
The Environment
During this session you and 11 other people will have to make decisions to invest resources in two markets. You will participate in 18 decision rounds, called periods. The first 3 periods will be for practice. The last 15 periods will determine your earnings at the end of the session.
At the start of the first round the 12 participants in the session will be divided into 3 groups of 4 people. The distribution of people to groups is random and none of the participants will know who is in his or her group. After each of the 18 periods is over, we will scramble the membership of all the groups, so that everyone is playing in a new group every period. Your earnings will depend upon the investment decisions that you make, the investment decisions that the members of your group make, and the investment decisions that the members of the other groups make. Your earnings in each round will be reported to you in Laboratory Dollars (L$). These will be converted to Canadian Dollars (C$) at the end of the session using the relationship 0.005×L$ = C$.
The Markets
At the beginning of each period you and each of the other participants will be given 28 tokens to invest. These tokens may be distributed in any way you wish between the two markets. Each period you will decide how many tokens to invest in Market 2. Whatever you do not invest in Market 2 will be automatically invested in Market 1.
Each token you invest in Market 1 yields a fixed return of L$3.25. This return per token is independent of the amount you invest or others invest in Market 1. Your return from Market 2 depends on the total investment in this market by all participants in the session.
Although you keep all of your return from Market 1, you and the rest of your group will pool your returns from Market 2 and share them equally. Thus your payoff from Market 1 equals your return from Market 1 and your payoff from Market 2 equals your share of your groups' returns from Market 2. Your total payoff for the period is the sum of your payoffs in the two markets.
Numerical Example
In today's session there will be 3 groups of 4 participants. Each participant will have an endowment of 28 tokens to distribute between investments in Market 1 and Market 2.
Suppose you invest 11 tokens in Market 2. Assume that each of the other members of your group invests 19 tokens. Assume that each of the other participants (not in your group) invests 17 tokens in Market 2.
Here is how your payoffs in Market 1 and Market 2 are calculated:
You invest 11 tokens in Market 2, leaving 17 tokens to be invested in Market 1.
The total investment in Market 2 by the other members of your group is 3×19 = 57 tokens.
The total investment in Market 2 by the participants not in your group is 8×17 = 136 tokens.
The total investment in Market 2 by all participants is 11 + 57 + 136 = 204 tokens.
The Market 2 Total Return Table shows To simplify these calculations, the computer will show you an abbreviated Payoff Table for Market 2 and a Payoff Wizard which will calculate the exact payoff for any combination of your investment, the average investment by others that are in your group, and the average investment by others that are not in your Table will be similar to the Payoff Table for Market 2 shown below.
The payoff based upon the numbers given in the previous section can be easily calculated from this Payoff Table. Since your group invested 11 + 57 = 68 tokens, the average investment by people in your group is 68/4 = 17 tokens. Locate the column headed "17". Since the other participants not in your group each invested 17 on average, locate the row labeled "17". The number at the intersection of these rows and columns (227.38) is your share of your group's return from Market 2. Adding L$55.25 (your payoff from Market 1) to this gives your total payoff of L$282.63.
Practice Periods
To let you learn more about the environment we are going to run 3 practice periods. The results from these periods will not contribute to your final earnings. If you have any questions during these 3 periods, please raise your hand and we will answer them.
After the 3 periods are over, we will scramble members of the groups and begin the 15 periods which contribute to your earnings.
(Monitor starts the session) Please examine your computer screens. In the upper right hand frame you will find a Payoff We are now ready to start the practice sessions. Please make your decisions and submit them.
(after results are shown)
The computer screens are now showing the results of the period. When you are finished examining them, please press Done (after screens change)
You are now ready to start the second practice period. Notice the results from last period are shown on the history page on the right hand side of your screen. Remember that the groups have all been scrambled and you will be in a new group every period. Please make your decisions and submit them as before.
The results of the second practice period are now being shown. Please examine them and then proceed to the third practice period.
(after third period begins) This is the third and final practice period. Please make your decisions and submit them as before. When the results of the third session appear, do not press the Done until you have read the remaining instructions.
(after the results appear)
Communication
Prior to the first paid period, you will be able to send messages to other members in your group. Everyone in your group will see the messages you send. To see how, please click now on the messenger tab in the lower portion of your screen. The messenger window will open. Then click on the lower (white) part of the box and type "hello". Please everyone type "hello" now. Then click the 'Send' button, so that others in your group can read your message. If you look at the messenger window you will see how many seconds remain for exchanging messages. The messenger window will be active for four minutes before the first paid period.
After the exchange of messages you will make investment decisions. Although you will make investment decision in a new group each period, the composition of your communication group is the same across all periods. More specifically, before making decisions, you will always be able to send messages to the same group as you communicate with in the first paid period.
Prior to the second and third decision periods, this is set at three minutes. Prior to the fourth round this is set at two minutes and from the fifth through the fifteenth rounds, communication is limited to one minute. Now please switch to the main window by clicking on the background.
Although we will record the messages your group sends to each other, only the people in your group will see them. In sending messages, you should follow two basic rules: (1) Be civil to one another and do not use profanities, and (2) Do not identify yourself in any manner. The communication channel is intended to discuss your choices and should be used that way. Please do not close any window at any time because that will cause delays and problems with the software.
Paid Periods
We are now about to begin the paid portion of the session. We will scramble the membership of all the groups so that your group will consist of a completely new set of 4 people in each of the next 15 periods.
If you have any questions, please ask them now. Please examine the results of the third practice period and press Done. When everyone has done this, the first paid period will begin automatically. Please continue to follow the computer prompts until the end of the session. There is an equation like this one for each member of each group. When the groups have more than one member, the equations for all of the members in any particular group are identical. This results in three unique equations of the form , where is the group identifier.
In the case of three four-person groups, there would be three equations with three unknowns, , , and . The solution will be .
The important result is that there is not a unique equilibrium quantity for the individual. The equilibrium condition requires that the sum of the contributions of the individuals in a group equals a unique value. There is a unique group Nash equilibrium allocation of effort to appropriation from the common pool. In this case, the unique group Nash equilibrium amount of effort is 52. The system effort is 156. 
III. 3. A Coalition-Proof Equilibrium for a CPR Environment with three Output-Sharing Groups, Local communication and Global communication
We can also derive a coalition proof equilibrium for three output-sharing groups that communicate locally as well as globally (our treatment FFC). In this environment there are only three possible configurations of groups. There can be a coalition of three groups, a coalition of two groups or no coalition. If a coalition of three groups forms and each group exerts 52 units of effort, there will be no incentive for one of the groups to leave the coalition. In this case the socially efficient outcome of 156 is also the coalitionproof equilibrium as the following 
Notes:
Coalition 1L: Outcome with 1 group as leader and 2 followers; this is a corner solution; this is not coalition proof. Coalition 2L: Outcome with a 2-group coalition as leader and 1 follower; this is an equilibrium, but it is not coalition proof. Coalition 1N: Nash equilibrium with three 1-group coalitions; this is coalition proof to marginal changes of coalition size; this is the group profit-maximization outcome. Coalition 2N: Nash outcome given one 2-group coalition and one 1-group coalition: this is not coalition proof. Coalition 3: Nash outcome given one 3-group coalition; this is a coalition-proof equilibrium Optimal: Payoffs in this line are the average individual payoffs. "Yield" is the return from the CPR to the coalition or to the follower. "Outside" is the return to effort not allocated to extraction from the CPR.
For a CPR environment with three output-sharing groups that cannot communicate locally, but can communicate globally, the socially efficient outcome of 156 units of effort is the coalition-proof equilibrium.
